Chapter 1 Excerpts

Although we have no statistic from the Cold War period for how many of the wars that ended through means other than negotiation relapsed into war, the five-year relapse rate of negotiated settlements means that the international community's batting average for settling wars through negotiation is only marginally better than it was during the Cold War. Further, the rate of negotiated peace relapsing into violence shows that the international community is better at stopping violence than building or consolidating peace. This statistic exemplifies the heart of the problem: *The challenge is not making peace, at least in some partial sense; rather, the difficulty is making peace last.* – pg. 5

Lasting peace will not likely be attained unless peacebuilding undergoes a productivity revolution. The central reason why peacebuilding programs are not more productive, or cost-effective, is that we are not working "smart." This is not to say that we lack smart, hardworking people in the field who are designing and carrying out a myriad of peacebuilding programs. The thousands of peacebuilding practitioners across the world are among the best and the brightest. Rather, the problem is that peacebuilders need the tools to create synergy among their programs in order to make their collective impact much greater than the sum of their individual projects. – pg. 7